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 I. Introduction 
 Reducing the barriers to international trade in services provides all of the usual 
opportunities and challenges for the United States economy:  The potential reductions in the 
U.S. barriers provide the opportunities for improvements in the allocations of U.S. 
resources, with commensurate improvements in productivity and welfare.  Further, because 
the U.S. has a comparative advantage in a number of major services areas -- such as airline 
services, financial services, educational services, many professional services, entertainment 
services, etc. -- the U.S. economy could also gain from reductions in services trade barriers 
abroad.  But, because of the mercantilist orientation of most trade negotiations, the 
reductions in barriers abroad would likely require that the U.S reduce its barriers.  But the 
losing parties from the reductions in the U.S. barriers have opposed and will surely continue 
to oppose such reductions. 
 All of this is standard stuff for trade barrier reductions.  There are additional 
features, however, that make reductions in trade barriers for services -- and the avoidance of 
the erection of new barriers -- especially interesting and worthwhile for the U.S.:  
International trade in services is an area that is growing faster than trade in goods -- for the 
world generally and for the U.S. specifically.  Also, unlike trade in goods, where for over a 
decade the U.S. has run ever-increasing annual net deficits, the U.S. continues to run 
                                                 
     * This essay draws heavily in some places on White (2001, 2002b, 2005).  I would like to 
thank Christine McDaniel for useful comments on an earlier draft. 
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surpluses in trade in services.  Also, trade in services is a growth area in terms of the amount 
of attention -- analytic as well as diplomatic -- that is being paid to it. 
 This essay will focus on trade in services and specifically on the recent U.S. 
experience and some U.S. issues.1  Section II offers a brief primer on trade in services itself.  
Section III next examines recent trade-in-services statistics for the world and for the U.S.  
Section IV then turns to a description of the current orientation of the U.S. toward services 
trade, the major existing restrictions and the ripe opportunities for reductions in U.S. trade 
barriers, and the dangers of new restraints.  Section V provides a brief conclusion. 
                                                 
     1 Since this essay focuses on the U.S., "foreign" corporations will mean those companies 
that are headquartered outside of the U.S., while "domestic" or "U.S." corporations will 
mean those companies that are headquartered in the U.S. 
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 II. Trade in Services -- A Primer 
 Services are usually not the first thing that most people visualize when they think of 
international trade.  Instead, it is trade in goods -- represented by sacks of grain, rolls of 
steel, barrels of oil, boxes of toys and electronic goods, etc. -- that is most readily visualized 
and that is often the subject of newspaper stories about trade and of policy debates about 
trade. 
 This is probably to be expected.  Goods are concrete; their movement can be 
physically tracked as they cross borders from one country to another.  Their concreteness 
helps in documentation and data gathering, as well as in understanding trade impediments 
such as tariffs and quotas. 
 By contrast, services are intangible; they can't be seen, touched, held, or felt.  It is no 
accident that international flows of services used to be described as "invisibles".  They flow 
internationally in different ways than do goods, so that the standard trade impediments 
(tariffs and quotas) usually don't apply.  Also, services are more likely to be subject to direct 
domestic regulation of their delivery, which then opens opportunities for more subtle (or, 
perhaps, not so subtle) trade restrictive efforts through this regulation.  In recognition of 
these differences, the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as the successor to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1995, brought with it a separate 
document and negotiating forum (under the umbrella of the WTO): the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). 
 These differences, and the likely lesser general familiarity with trade in services, 
make a brief discussion of the basics of trade in services worthwhile. 
A. The four modes of trade in services. 
 As was noted above, services often don't flow across borders in the same way as 
goods flow.  In recognition of this difference, a four-part classification system for services 
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flows has developed and is generally accepted:2 (1) cross-border; (2) consumption abroad; 
(3) commercial presence; and (4) temporary presence (presence of natural persons).  We 
expand on each category below. 
 1. Cross-border.  Some services can and do actually originate in one country and 
"move" across a border to a user-recipient in another country.  Examples include: 
 - electricity; 
 - telephone and similar telecommunications services; 
 - the transportation and logistics services that attach to the physical movement of 
goods in international trade; 
 - the transportation of people across borders; 
 - the sales services that attach to a sale (of goods or services) across borders; 
 - the provision of a loan, deposit, insurance, or other financial services product 
across a border; 
 - distance learning, whereby a student in one country takes a course (e.g., via the 
Internet) offered by an educational institution in another country. 
 2. Consumption abroad.  Some services are consumed through the travel of the 
customer from one country to the provider in another country.  Examples include: 
 - tourism; 
 - education abroad; 
 - repair services abroad; 
 - medical treatment abroad. 
 3. Commercial presence.  For many services, the service is most effectively 
provided/sold to the customer through a local physical establishment in the country of the 
                                                 
     2 These four modes are specified in article I of the GATS.  Standard discussions of trade in 
services provide the examples listed below in the text, as well as other examples, and 
expand on them.  See, for example, Bressand and Nicolaidis (1989), Hoekman and Braga 
(1997), Aharoni and Nachum (2000), Sauve and Stern (2000), Stephenson (2000), Findlay 
and Warren (2000), Hoekman (2000), Stern (2001), and Mattoo and Sauve (2003). 
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consumer.  For example, though a loan could (in principle) be made by a bank that was 
located solely in country X to a borrower who was located solely in country Y (and thus be 
a "cross-border" transaction along the lines of #1 above), the bank's ability to assure itself 
that the borrower was a good risk who would be likely to repay the loan would usually be 
enhanced by the bank's having a local branch ("commercial presence") in country Y for 
interviewing and monitoring the borrower.  As another example, a restaurant chain or a 
hotel chain in country X may believe that its services would be attractive also to customers 
in country Y, but few of the latter would be willing to travel to country X just for those 
services.  In this case, the establishment of local outlets in country Y may be the only way 
for those services to be delivered. 
 More generally, examples of services providers through "commercial presence" 
would include: 
 - banks and other financial services providers; 
 - restaurant chains; 
 - hotel chains; 
 - retail merchandise chains; 
 - accountancy branches; 
 - legal services branches. 
 Since "commercial presence" does require a physical presence, the provision of 
services through this channel will usually require investment in the host country from the 
services firm in its home country (i.e., foreign direct investment, or FDI).  Also, home 
country personnel may need to travel to the location abroad (i.e., the host country) so as to 
initiate the operations, train local personnel, periodically monitor the operations, etc.  Thus, 
this mode brings other international transactions -- FDI and labor movement -- with it.  In 
turn, these additional international flows mean that there are more (and more subtle) 
opportunities for host countries to impede the flow of services from abroad through 
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restrictions on FDI and restrictions on immigration, as well as through more direct 
limitations on commercial location and establishment itself. 
 4. Temporary presence (presence of natural persons).  Some services may be best 
delivered through the temporary presence of an individual or a group of individuals who 
deliver the service while abroad.  Examples include: 
 - visiting entertainers (e.g., visiting orchestras, theater companies, rock stars); 
 - temporary consultancies; 
 - short-term construction projects. 
 Again, because individuals from a home country must travel to a host country in 
order to deliver the service, immigration policy can become an indirect means of impeding 
the flow of the service. 
B. Domestic regulation. 
 Services are often subject to extensive regulation by governments.  As one 
illustration, consider the set of industries that were considered to be extensively regulated in 
the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s and that were the targets of major efforts at deregulation or 
regulatory reform during the last quarter of the twentieth century:3 
 - air transport; 
 - rail transport; 
 - truck transport; 
 - water transport; 
 - natural gas pipeline transport; 
 - petroleum pipeline transport; 
 - telephone; 
 - broadcasting; 
                                                 
     3 See, for example, Joskow and Rose (1989), Noll (1989), Winston (1993), and Joskow 
and Noll (1994). 
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 - electricity; 
 - banking; 
 - securities; 
 - insurance. 
All of these industries are services providers.  Further, though this list is drawn from the 
U.S. experience, in other countries these same industries were either also heavily regulated 
or were under government ownership. 
 Though these industries are considerably less regulated today in the U.S. than they 
were three decades ago, a remnant of regulation -- modest in some industries, still 
substantial in others -- persists today.  Similarly, in many other countries, the partial 
deregulation or privatization over the past few decades has meant that greater or lesser 
remnants of regulation persist. 
 For another broad category of services -- e.g., professional services, such as medical 
services, legal services, accountancy services, architectural services, etc. -- government 
regulation occurs through licensing boards (or through delegation to professional 
associations, with government oversight) that are intended to maintain quality standards, 
prevent fraud, and protect the public. 
 Government regulation of the various kinds of services industries adds a layer of 
complexity to efforts to reduce impediments to international trade in services, since the 
regulatory regimes themselves can become separate centers of resistance to the removal of 
barriers. 
C. A paucity of data 
 Another special feature of services is the relative paucity of detailed data with 
respect to services, as compared with manufacturing in the U.S. and elsewhere.  Despite the 
fact that services in the U.S. now account for over 75% of private-sector GDP and 75% of 
private-sector employment, while manufacturing accounts for only 15% and 12%, 
respectively, the quantity of data and the levels of detail that are available for the 
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manufacturing sector – say, from the semi-decennial economic censuses or from 
international trade data – far exceed those that are available for the services sector.  This 
disparity is a legacy from the 1930s, when the basic statistical-gathering functions of the 
federal government were established and manufacturing was substantially more important in 
the U.S. economy.  Though efforts are being made to rectify this disparity,4 it still hobbles 
efforts to understand services – and trade in services – at a deeper level. 
D. The GATS. 
 Through the mid 1970s there was little perception that trade in services was an 
important enough phenomenon to warrant substantial attention.5  Instead, virtually all of the 
post-World War II multilateral effort at trade liberalization was focused on trade in goods 
through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 In the late 1970s, however, as the U.S. began the deregulation of its domestic airline 
industry, the same commitment to greater competition (and the dawning realization that the 
U.S. had a comparative advantage) began manifesting itself internationally through U.S. 
efforts to negotiate bilateral "open skies" arrangements to reduce the impediments that U.S. 
airlines faced abroad.  Further, the U.S. was also increasingly concerned about how other 
countries were treating the overseas branches of U.S. banks and how U.S. entertainment 
services, such as movies and syndicated television programs, were being treated.  In 
addition, the European Common Market (ECM) was recognizing that the flows of various 
kinds of services, among its member countries and between the ECM and the rest of the 
world, was a major task that warranted substantial attention.  In the early 1980s the U.S. 
began a concerted effort to bring trade in services into the realm of multinational negotiation 
and bargaining. 
                                                 
   4 See, for example, Lazear (2007). 
 
     5 A more extensive treatment of the diplomatic history that eventually led to the GATS 
can be found in Nicolaidis (1989). 
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 During the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s there was a more general international realization that trade in services needed to be 
brought into a more formal multilateral negotiating arena.  As a consequence, along with the 
formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) itself as the successor to the 
organization that had administered the GATT, a general agreement on trade in services -- 
the GATS -- was negotiated, and the GATT and the GATS became parallel pillars of the 
newly formed WTO.6  The GATS (with a Council on Trade in Services to administer it) 
came into effect on January 1, 1995. 
 The GATS is a broad set of principles that has the goal of encouraging freer trade in 
services among the WTO member countries.  It applies to virtually all services, with the 
exception of government services that are non-commercial in nature (e.g., social insurance, 
public safety, national defense) and air traffic rights.  It establishes general commitments 
toward most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, transparency in the domestic regulation of 
services, market access, and national treatment of services suppliers.  It formally recognizes 
that services can be delivered through any of the four modes discussed above. 
 Unfortunately, the GATS is also riddled with loopholes and exceptions, which are 
the formal recognition in the GATS of the sensitivities and difficulties that come with many 
services sectors, especially those that are regulated along the lines discussed above.  The 
most important loophole is that each country can choose which of its services sectors, 
through which mode, will be subject to the specific provisions of the GATS (and, implicitly, 
which will be exempt).  Further, the leadership of the GATS and of the WTO, in deference 
to national sensitivities about domestic regulatory issues, have stressed the ability of 
governments to limit their commitments to removing barriers.7 
                                                 
     6 An "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" (TRIPS) was 
also negotiated during the Uruguay Round and also placed within the WTO. 
     7 See, for example, WTO (2001). 
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 Actual progress in effecting reductions in services trade barriers -- because of all of 
the sensitivities to regulatory issues -- has been slow.8  The GATS has been in existence for 
about twelve years.  After an initial set of statements and commitments at its inception, the 
"serious" negotiations were supposed to occur after 2000 in what has come to be called the 
Doha Round, with the negotiated reductions to be put in place at the end of the Round.  
Unfortunately, the Doha Round fell apart in July 2006 over a range of issues, and it is 
unclear what will happen next and also unclear whether any negotiated reductions will 
actually occur. 
 Further, the structure of the GATS and its substantial deference to domestic 
regulation has created a seemingly inherent bias toward inaction.9  The efforts aimed at 
reducing barriers to trade in accountancy services are a good example.10  Early in its 
existence the Council on Trade in Services chose accountancy as a lead sector (among the 
heavily regulated professional services sectors) for more detailed and extensive negotiations 
aimed at reducing trade barriers, because accountancy already had substantial international 
presences through the international expansions of a (literal) handful of large accountancy 
firms.  In 1998 the Council adopted "disciplines" (rules) on the domestic regulation of 
accountancy that were intended to provide greater detail on issues of transparency, licensing 
requirements and procedures, qualification requirements and procedures, and technical 
standards.  The disciplines were not to come into force, however, until the conclusion of the 
Doha Round (which has fallen apart).  When the GATS announced a "Workshop on 
                                                 
     8 This is the clear tenor of the essays in Mattoo and Sauve (2003), with the possible 
exception of the essay (Roseman, 2003) on telecommunications. 
     9 The arcane and opaque terminology of the GATS -- "schedules", "bindings", 
"disciplines", "negative lists", etc. -- surely does not enhance outsiders' understanding and 
monitoring of the process. 
     10 More details can be found in White (2001, 2005) and Trolliet and Hegerty (2003). 
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Domestic Regulation" that was to be held on March 29-30, 2004, and highlighted 
accountancy, the most recent progress that it could cite in that area was the 1998 disciplines. 
 Excerpts from the "Abstract" and "Introduction" sections of two recent GATS 
Working Papers11 provide excellent expressions of the exceedingly modest progress that has 
been achieved under the GATS: 
 
 "...Members have more scope than under the GATT to depart from 
common horizontal obligations, in particular the MFN principle; they are 
able to adjust the breadth and depth of their trade commitments (market 
access and national treatment) to particular sector conditions; and they face 
less constraints, if any, in the use of trade-related policies such as subsidies, 
export restrictions, or domestic regulatory interventions... [T]he basic (built-
in) flexibility elements of the Agreement ... will, of course, persist... 
However, flexibility may come at a cost: lack of meaningful obligations 
across a reasonably broad range of service sectors.  Vested interests may find 
it far easier than under the GATT to defend their privileges and defy more 
rational and harmonized trading conditions... (Adlung, 2004, p. 1) 
 "The ... absence of major problems [within the GATS] to date may 
be attributed to at least three factors:... Second, the lack of stringent, non-
modifiable trade obligations.  There are virtually no requirements that 
individual Members might find difficult to meet or, otherwise, elude under 
relevant exemptions.  The GATS offers more scope for departures from 
most-favored-nations (MFN) treatment -- one of the few horizontal 
obligations that apply across virtually all services -- than is the case under 
relevant GATT Articles.  Moreover, traditional building blocks of the 
GATT, including the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and the 
automatic guarantee of national treatment with regard to domestic rules and 
regulations, are negotiable under the GATS..." (Adlung, 2004, p. 2) 
 "Over the past months, it has become increasingly clear that the 
services negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda will not produce 
significant improvements on current commitments unless major new impetus 
is provided...  [T]his paper discusses various impediments, from the 
perspective of the participating governments, that may explain the lack of 
negotiating momentum to date..." (Adlung and Roy, 2005, p. 2) 
 "The services commitments that resulted from the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1993/94), the first such round to cover trade in services as well, 
apparently have not had significant liberalization effects.  Barring a few 
exceptions in basic telecommunications and financial services, where 
negotiations continued until February and December 1997, respectively, the 
commitments inscribed in Members' schedules remained essentially 
                                                 
     11 See Adlung (2004) and Adlung and Roy (2005). 
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confined to binding existing regimes in a limited number of sectors.  Further, 
many commitments may have been overtaken by autonomous liberalization 
moves in individual countries... This paper seeks to explore why 
commitments under the GATS have generally remained modest..." (Adlung 
and Roy, 2005, p. 3) 
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 III. Some Data 
 A priori, one would expect to see rising levels of international trade in services, for 
at least five reasons.  First, services generally appear to have an income elasticity of demand 
that is substantially greater than 1.0, especially in developed economies.  As developed 
countries grow, they tend to produce and consume more-than-proportionately greater levels 
of services.  To the extent that any services can cross borders, we would expect the growing 
demand for services to affect these cross-border services as well, which would be captured 
in economic statistics as growth in international trade in services.12 
 Second, the technologies -- telecommunications, data processing and digitization, 
transportation, biological sciences -- that underlie many important categories of services 
have experienced rapid improvements in the past few decades.13  As a consequence, better 
quality services, with greater variations and variety, can be offered by more firms at lower 
costs over longer distances; more effective competition among providers follows.  The real 
prices (quality-adjusted and inflation-adjusted) of many services has surely decreased, 
which reinforces the income-elasticity effects to encourage greater consumption of services.  
And, again, some of this greater consumption should spill over to international trade in 
services. 
 Third, the improvements in telecommunications, data processing, and transportation 
technologies have also allowed firms to operate effectively over longer geographic distances 
and thus to allow services providers (such as hotel and restaurant chains) that require a 
commercial presence to be able to expand their reach and offerings. 
 Fourth, digitization of various kinds of information -- e.g., credit scores of potential 
borrowers, the X-rays of medical patients, etc. -- and reduced telecommunications costs 
                                                 
     12 For recent estimates of the income and price elasticities of demand that pertain to major 
categories of U.S. exports and imports of services, see Marquez (2005). 
     13 See Bosworth and Triplett (2004) for a general discussion. 
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have permitted some services (credit assessment, X-ray reading) that were previously 
vertically integrated with the final service (making a loan, health care) to be "outsourced".  
With low-cost telecommunications extending internationally, the outsourced services can 
become "offshored" internationally traded services.14 
 Finally, to the extent that countries have reduced their barriers to trade in services, 
those reductions too should encourage greater growth. 
 As we will see, the data strongly support these predictions.  We will first present 
briefly some world trade data and then some more extensive U.S. data. 
A. World data. 
 Table 1 shows the experience of the world trading system for the past quarter 
century for goods and services.  Consistent with the brief discussion above, trade in services 
has grown substantially: faster than trade in goods, and faster than the growth in world GDP.  
It is worth noting that these data exclude the "commercial presence" mode (mode #3 above) 
of services exports, which has probably grown even faster (at least as is indicated by the 
U.S. data that are discussed below). 
 Table 2 shows the identity of the leading exporters and importers of goods and 
services, as of 2005.  As would be expected, the world's largest economies are the world's 
leading traders as well, with the U.S. holding first place in three of the four categories and 
second in the fourth. 
B. U.S. data. 
 Table 3 shows the experience specifically of the U.S. over this same quarter century.  
Again, consistent with the discussion above, trade in services has grown substantially: faster 
than trade in goods and faster than U.S. GDP, as well as faster than world trade in services. 
                                                 
     14 For further discussions along these lines, see Mann (2005), Jensen and Kletzer (2006), 
Van Welsum and Reif (2006), and (more generally) Collins and Brainard (2006). 
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 Table 4 provides the year-by-year annual trade data for goods and services for 1992-
2005.  As can be readily seen, trade in services has maintained a consistent annual surplus, 
while the annual deficit in trade in goods has grown progressively larger. 
 Table 5 provides annual data for 1992-2005 for finer categories of services trade.15  
Travel (i.e., tourism) has shown modest growth rates on both the export and import sides.  
Passenger fares (largely airline fares plus cruise lines) showed slow growth in exports but 
much larger growth in imports.  Other transportation (i.e., ocean shipping, air freight, ocean 
port services, and airport services) showed faster growth of imports than of exports.  
Royalties and license fees (mostly fees paid to affiliates for intellectual property, plus fees 
paid for broadcasting international sports events) grew substantially, especially on the 
import side.  Other private services (including education; financial services; insurance; 
telecommunications; film and television tape rentals; and business, professional, and 
technical services) grew rapidly;16 finally, U.S. military and other government services grew 
at slow to medium rates. 
 Finally, Table 6 shows the annual data for 1992-2005 for sales of services through 
nonbank affiliates -- in essence, sales of services through a commercial presence (mode #3 
discussed above).  As can be seen, the flows in both directions grew faster than did the 
services flows shown in Table 4.  Further, sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies to 
non-U.S. persons grew faster than the sales by the U.S. affiliates of foreign companies to 
U.S. persons, and the net balance was a growing and sizable surplus.  It is also worth noting 
that for recent years the absolute sizes of the services sales in each direction have been larger 
than the counterpart services exports and imports listed in Table 4, and the annual surpluses 
                                                 
     15 Greater detail and discussion can be found in Koncz et al. (2006) and USITC (2006). 
     16 The persistent annual surpluses in this category are prominently noted in USCEA 
(2005, pp. 178-179). 
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for 2003 and 2004 in Table 6 are also larger than the services surpluses in Table 4 for the 
same years. 
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 IV. Opportunities for Reductions in Trade Barriers 
A. The general landscape. 
 The U.S. economy -- with some notable exceptions -- is generally open to non-U.S. 
providers of services through any of the four modes.17  Even in relatively open areas, 
however, there are some subtle problems. 
 Financial services provide a good example.  As a general matter, with respect to 
financial services the U.S. generally does not discriminate against non-U.S. banks or 
securities firms or insurance companies, and non-U.S. firms have developed sizable shares 
of the U.S. market (as measured by assets or other standard metrics).18  As a first subtle 
problem, however, since financial services are frequently regulated by the 50 states as well 
as by the U.S. Government,19 anomalous state regulations sometimes make entry and 
establishment by foreign firms somewhat harder than is true for U.S. firms.20 
 Second, in the area of housing finance, the U.S. has chartered three large 
"government-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs) -- Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System -- that are private companies with special privileges and 
advantages.21  The most important advantage is the reduced borrowing costs that these 
GSEs enjoy as a consequence of their GSE status and the financial markets' perception that 
the U.S. Government would likely "bail them out" and thus make their creditors whole in 
                                                 
     17 See the discussions in Brewer and Young (2001), Mann (2005), WTO (2006b) and 
USITC (2006). 
     18 See, for example, the data and discussion in White (2002a). 
     19 Insurance is an exception, in that it is regulated solely by the states. 
     20 Further discussion on this point can be found in USITC (2002, ch. 5) and WTO 
(2006b). 
     21 Further discussion of these GSEs can be found, for example, in Frame and Wall (2002), 
Frame (2003), White (2003, 2004), Frame and White (2004, 2005), and Frame and Flannery 
(2006). 
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the event of financial difficulties at any of the GSEs.  Only these three GSEs have these 
special charters, and the Congress is unlikely to create more such charters.  Consequently, 
this special area of housing finance22 is effectively barred to new entry and competition 
from new firms with such charters -- whether the firms are foreign or domestic. 
 Third, the major bond rating companies (e.g., Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and 
Fitch) have been protected since 1975 by a little-known set of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations.23  These regulations created a category "Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization" (NRSRO) and "grandfathered" the three major 
firms into the category.  Though the SEC subsequently designated four more firms as 
NRSROs, by 2000 mergers among the four and with Fitch had reduced the number of 
NRSROs back to the original three. 
 The importance of the NRSRO designation lies in the following:  Many categories 
of regulated financial services firm are restricted as to the quality of bonds that they can hold 
in their portfolios (i.e., in which they can invest).  For example, commercial banks and other 
depository institutions are permitted to hold only "investment grade" bonds.  Crucially, only 
the NRSROs' designations of quality (e.g., their designations of "investment grade") matter 
for the financial institutions' choices -- and thus the absence of the NRSRO designation 
causes a would-be bond rating firm to be at a substantial disadvantage. 
 Moody's and S&P are U.S. companies; Fitch is the subsidiary of a French 
conglomerate.  There is no evidence that the SEC has any "home company" bias.  Indeed, 
when (under Congressional pressure) in early 2003 the SEC designated a fourth NRSRO, it 
chose a Canadian bond rating company, Dominion Bond Rating Services (DBRS).24  
                                                 
     22 It is important to note, however, that entry into housing finance more generally is open 
to foreign firms as well as to domestic firms. 
     23 For expansion on this topic, see White (2002b, 2006, 2007). 
     24 When the SEC designated a fifth NRSRO in early 2005, it chose A.M Best, an 
insurance company specialist. 
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Nevertheless, it is clear that the SEC's NRSRO designation is a barrier to entry into the bond 
rating business in the U.S. and thus a restriction on trade in services if a foreign firm would 
otherwise want to enter and provide bond rating services in the U.S. (as DBRS had desired 
prior to 2003, and as other foreign firms have indicated to the SEC).25 
 There are likely other such subtle restrictions on trade in services that are strewn 
across the regulatory landscape in the U.S. 
B. The major restrictions. 
 There are four major areas for which there are notable restrictions on trade in 
services in the U.S.: air transport; water transport; truck transport; and satellite broadcasting 
spectrum licenses.  We will discuss each in turn.26 
 1. Air transport.  Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958, any company that provides point-to-point passenger or freight air service 
within the U.S. ("cabotage") must be a U.S. carrier.  This means that the company must be 
under the actual control of U.S. citizens, and foreign ownership is limited to a maximum of 
25% of voting shares.  Also, the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors 
and other managing officers must be U.S. citizens.  The crews of a U.S. carrier must be U.S. 
citizens or resident aliens. 
 All of these requirements have effectively prevented foreign carriers from offering 
domestic service in the U.S. 
 In addition, the Fly America Act of 1974 requires that U.S. government-financed 
international transportation of passengers and cargo be on a U.S.-flag carrier (although 
exceptions are possible). 
                                                 
     25 In the late summer of 2006 new legislation was passed that was intended to loosen the 
SEC's restrictions on entry into the bond rating business.  Whether that intent will be 
converted into actuality will be determined by how the SEC drafts and implements the new 
regulations that are required by the legislation.  For further discussion, see White (2007). 
   26 Extensive discussions of these restrictions and their consequences can be found in 
USITC (1999, ch. 5; 2002, ch. 5; 2004, ch. 5) 
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 2. Water transport.  The Jones Act of 1920 restricts the domestic point-to-point 
transport of cargo to ships that are registered and built in the U.S., on which at least 75% of 
the employees are U.S. citizens, and that are owned by a U.S. corporation.  Domestic 
passenger service (essentially, cruise lines) must meet similar requirements under the 
Passenger Vessel Services Act of 1886.  Though foreign companies could, in principle, 
establish a shipping company in the U.S. through a holding company arrangement, the other 
requirements have effectively discouraged such actions, and U.S. water-borne cabotage is a 
U.S. preserve. 
 In addition, various pieces of legislation require that 50%-100% (depending on the 
category) of "government-impelled" international cargoes -- such as military cargo, oil for 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and foreign aid cargo -- be carried in U.S.-flag ships (that 
are built in the U.S., on which at least 75% of the employees are U.S. citizens, and that are 
owned by a U.S. corporation).  Despite these restrictions, 98% of U.S. international water-
borne cargo travels in non-U.S. flag ships.  Nevertheless, the restrictions on the remaining 
2% are effectively a restraint on trade. 
 3. Truck transport.  Realistically, the import of trucking services is likely to occur 
largely from Canada and Mexico.  Neither country’s trucks are permitted to provide 
domestic point-to-point freight service within the U.S.;27 thus, yet another category of 
cabotage is reserved for U.S. firms. 
 The use of foreign-owned trucks for the delivery of international cargo to points 
within the U.S. is a separate, and important, category of concern.  About 70% of goods 
imports from Canada enter the U.S. by truck; the comparable figure for goods imports by 
truck from Mexico is over 80%. 
                                                 
   27 A modest exception is available to Canadian trucks that are delivering or picking up 
international cargoes in the U.S.; they can transport goods between points within the 
U.S., so long as the local shipment is incidental to an immediately prior or subsequent 
international trip. 
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 Efforts began in the 1980s to harmonize regulations between the U.S. and Canada.  
These efforts continued under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1992, so that delivery of international 
cargoes by Canadian trucks is currently not considered to be a major problem. 
 With respect to the use of Mexican-owned trucks for the delivery of international 
cargoes, however, the picture is quite different.  Despite specific provisions in NAFTA for 
the progressive expansion of the reach of Mexican trucks to all points in the U.S., Mexican 
trucks are still (as of 2007) restricted to deliveries within a few miles of the border, 
necessitating costly and inefficient cargo transfers for most cargoes from Mexico. 
 4. Satellite broadcasting spectrum.  The Communications Act of 1934 restricts the 
granting of electromagnetic spectrum licenses to U.S. citizens or corporations; but it is 
possible for a foreign company to establish a holding company that owns a U.S. corporation 
that has such licenses. 
 However, the Communications Act also restricts foreign ownership of one-way 
satellite transmissions of direct-to-home (DTH), direct broadcasting systems (DBS), and 
digital audio services, and the holding company work-around does not appear to be 
available to undo this restriction. 
C. The opportunities and the challenges. 
 As is true in other areas of international trade, the U.S. Government's position with 
respect to trade in services is a mixture of export boosterism and import protectionism.  On 
the one hand, in areas in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage -- such as international 
airline services, financial services, and entertainment services -- the U.S. has been actively 
promoting "open skies" and its financial and entertainment equivalents.  On the other hand, 
in areas where the U.S. has a comparative disadvantage, such as ocean shipping, or where 
important national interests are seen to be at stake, such as domestic airline service or 
satellite services, the U.S. remains protectionist. 
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 This bifurcation in perspective is largely typical of the mercantilist perspective that 
continues to dominate national policy-making:  Exports are good; imports are bad; "jobs" 
saved and created are all-important; we will (maybe) lower our trade barriers only if you 
promise to lower yours; etc.  It pervades the U.S. policy perspective with respect to trade in 
goods.  There's no reason to expect that it wouldn't pervade trade in services as well. 
 It is clear that there would be net gains in U.S. social welfare if the major restrictions 
identified above were relaxed, even unilaterally.28  Further, because the U.S. has a 
comparative advantage in many important services -- e.g., airline services, educational 
services, financial services, entertainment services, etc. -- the U.S. economy could also gain 
from reductions in services trade barriers abroad.  These latter reductions could well require, 
as a quid pro quo, the reductions in the major U.S. barriers.  However, the reduction or 
removal of these major restrictions -- which would require contentious legislation29 -- do not 
seem to be "on the table" for discussion and negotiation.30 
 There are two other trade-in-services issues that are of concern.  First, as a 
consequence of the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. clearly tightened its immigration 
procedures, which must make it harder for foreign services providers to maintain their 
efforts in the U.S.  Substantial levels of illegal immigration into the U.S. have generated 
                                                 
     28 The "national defense" argument for retaining these restrictions on domestic air service 
and waterborne trade are weak, at best, and the goals could be achieved at lesser social costs 
through various contingent contracting arrangements by the U.S. Department of Defense.  
The “highway safety” arguments that are used to justify the restrictions on Mexican trucking 
in the U.S. are similarly weak. 
     29 Beginning in late 2005 the U.S. Department of Transportation explored the possibility 
that it could (through a liberal interpretation of the relevant legislation) find a way around 
the foreign ownership restrictions on domestic airline service (so as to accommodate the 
possibility of the Virgin Group's establishing domestic service) but ultimately abandoned the 
effort in December 2006. 
     30 In its initial policy statement that was preliminary to the WTO's 2006 "Trade Policy 
Review", the U.S. did not mention any of its major services trade restrictions.  See WTO 
(2006a). 
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calls for a general reform of immigration policy.  There are always dangers that changes in 
immigration policy could further restrict the inflow of foreign workers, with unfortunate 
consequences for trade in services. 
 Second, there has been a rising level of political attention to the offshore outsourcing 
of some services, such as telephone call centers, backoffice data processing, software 
development, and other information technology functions.  This outsourcing has grown as a 
consequence of decreasing telecommunications and data processing costs and the generally 
increasing scope, breadth, and quality of digitization technologies.31  Fortunately, this 
greater political attention has not (yet) been translated into any restrictive actions or policies.  
But the possibility of restrictions surely continues as a worrisome threat to freer trade in 
these services. 
                                                 
     31 See Mann (2005) and Van Welsum and Reif (2006). 
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 V. Conclusion 
 Trade in services is a growing and worthwhile area for the U.S. and the world.  
Though the U.S. is a comparatively open economy with respect to trade in services (as well 
as trade in goods), there are some major restrictions that are worthy of relaxation, as well as 
some more subtle problems.  Further, since the U.S. has a comparative advantage in a 
number of major services areas, the U.S. economy would benefit from the relaxation of 
restrictions abroad.  Finally, policy concerns about immigration (which is essential for many 
forms of trade in services) and about the offshore outsourcing of some services could lead to 
new restrictions, with unfortunate consequences for trade in services. 
 Though the long-run trends of reduced restrictions on and expanded flows of trade in 
services have been favorable and probably will continue to be so, the attractiveness of 
protectionism and mercantilism should never be underestimated.  Wary optimism and 
watchful readiness may well be the best attitudes for those who care about maintaining and 
open environment for trade in services. 
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Table 1: World Trade and GDP Data, 2005 
 
 Levels, 2005 Average annual % change, 1980-2005 
   
World trade: services $2,415B 7.85%
World trade: goods $10,539B 6.74%
World GDP $44,455B 5.47%
 
Note: All values in nominal $; average annual % change is calculated as simple annual 
compounding of last year/first year 
Sources: WTO; IMF 
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Table 2: Leading World Exporters and Importers, 2005 
 
Goods Exports Services Exports Goods Imports Services Imports 
    
Germany U.S. U.S. U.S. 
U.S. U.K. Germany Germany 
China Germany China U.K. 
Japan France France Japan 
France Japan U.K. France 
 
Source: WTO 
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Table 3: U.S. Trade and GDP Data, 2005 
 
 Levels, 2005 Average annual % change, 1980-2005 
   
Services exports $381B 8.67%
Services imports $315B 8.44%
Goods exports $895B 5.69%
Goods imports $1,677B 7.92%
GDP $12,479B 6.18%
 
Note: All values are in nominal $; average annual % change is calculated as simple 
annual compounding of last year/first year 
Sources: BEA; CEA 
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Table 4: U.S. Trade Data, 1992-2005 
 
Services Goods 
Year Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
    
1992 $177B $120B $58B $440B $537B $-97B 
1993 186 124 62 457 589 -132 
1994 200 133 67 503 669 -166 
1995 219 141 78 575 749 -174 
1996 239 153 87 612 803 -191 
1997 256 166 90 678 876 -198 
1998 263 181 82 670 917 -247 
1999 282 199 83 684 1030 -346 
2000 299 224 75 772 1224 -452 
2001 286 222 64 719 1146 -427 
2002 292 231 61 682 1165 -482 
2003 303 250 52 713 1261 -547 
2004 344 290 54 808 1473 -665 
2005 381 315 66 895 1677 -783 
Avg. ann. % 
ch., 1992-2005 6.05 7.73 5.62 9.16  
 
Note: All values are in nominal $; average annual % change is calculated as simple 
annual compounding of last year/first year; average annual % change in U.S. GDP, 1992-
2005 is 5.35% 
Source: BEA 
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Table 5: U.S. Services Trade Data, 1992-2005 
(all values are in $ billions) 
 
 
Travel 
 
Passenger Fares 
Other 
Transportation 
Royalties & 
License Fees 
Other Private 
Services 
 
U. S. Military 
 
U.S. Gov. Misc. 
 
Total Services 
                         
Year Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal Ex Im Bal 
1992 55 39 16 17 11 6 22 24 -2 21 5 16 50 25 25 12 14 -1 1 2 -1 177 120 58 
1993 58 41 17 17 11 5 22 25 -3 22 5 17 54 28 26 13 12 1 1 2 -1 186 124 62 
1994 58 44 15 17 13 4 24 26 -2 27 6 21 61 32 29 13 10 3 1 3 -2 200 133 67 
1995 63 45 18 19 15 4 26 27 -1 30 7 23 65 35 30 15 10 5 1 3 -2 219 141 78 
1996 70 48 22 20 16 5 26 27 -1 32 8 25 73 40 34 16 11 5 1 3 -2 239 153 87 
1997 73 52 21 21 18 3 27 29 -2 33 9 24 84 43 41 17 12 5 1 3 -2 256 166 90 
1998 71 56 15 20 20 0 26 30 -5 36 11 24 92 48 44 17 12 5 1 3 -2 263 181 82 
1999 75 59 16 20 21 -2 27 34 -7 40 13 27 104 56 48 16 13 3 1 3 -2 282 199 83 
2000 82 65 18 21 24 -4 30 41 -12 43 16 27 108 61 47 14 13 0 1 3 -2 299 224 75 
2001 72 60 12 18 23 -5 28 39 -10 41 17 24 114 66 48 13 15 -2 1 3 -2 286 222 64 
2002 67 59 8 17 20 -3 29 38 -9 45 19 25 122 73 50 12 19 -7 1 3 -2 292 231 61 
2003 64 57 7 16 21 -5 32 45 -13 47 19 28 131 80 51 13 25 -13 1 3 -2 303 250 52 
2004 75 66 9 19 24 -5 37 54 -17 53 23 29 145 90 54 15 29 -14 1 4 -3 344 290 54 
2005 82 69 13 21 26 -5 42 62 -20 57 25 33 158 99 60 19 30 -11 1 4 -3 381 315 66 
Avg ann % 
ch, 1992-
2005 3.13 4.60  1.79 7.16  5.32 7.67  8.11 12.73  9.22 11.01  3.36 6.15  1.99 4.44  6.05 7.73  
 
Note: All values are in nominal $; average annual % change is calculated as simple annual compounding of last year/first year; 
average annual % change in U.S. GDP, 1992-2005 is 5.35% 
Source: BEA 
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Table 6: Sales of Services through Affiliates 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Sales to foreign 
persons by foreign 
nonbank affiliates of 
U.S. Companies 
Sales to U.S. persons 
by U.S. nonbank 
affiliates of foreign 
companies 
 
 
 
Difference 
  
1992 $141B $128B $13B 
1993 143 135 8 
1994 159 145 14 
1995 190 150 40 
1996 223 168 55 
1997 255 223 32 
1998 286 246 40 
1999 353 294 59 
2000 414 344 70 
2001 422 368 54 
2002 424 368 56 
2003 452 374 78 
2004 490 383 107 
Avg. ann. % 
ch., 1992-2004 10.94 9.56
 
 
Source: Koncz et al. (2006). 
